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Abstract
The first decade of this century has seen the nascency of the first mathe-
matical theory of general artificial intelligence. This theory of Universal Artifi-
cial Intelligence (UAI) has made significant contributions to many theoretical,
philosophical, and practical AI questions. In a series of papers culminating in
book (Hutter, 2005), an exciting sound and complete mathematical model for
a super intelligent agent (AIXI) has been developed and rigorously analyzed.
While nowadays most AI researchers avoid discussing intelligence, the award-
winning PhD thesis (Legg, 2008) provided the philosophical embedding and
investigated the UAI-based universal measure of rational intelligence, which
is formal, objective and non-anthropocentric. Recently, effective approxima-
tions of AIXI have been derived and experimentally investigated in JAIR
paper (Veness et al. 2011). This practical breakthrough has resulted in some
impressive applications, finally muting earlier critique that UAI is only a the-
ory. For the first time, without providing any domain knowledge, the same
agent is able to self-adapt to a diverse range of interactive environments. For
instance, AIXI is able to learn from scratch to play TicTacToe, Pacman, Kuhn
Poker, and other games by trial and error, without even providing the rules
of the games.
These achievements give new hope that the grand goal of Artificial General
Intelligence is not elusive.
This article provides an informal overview of UAI in context. It attempts
to gently introduce a very theoretical, formal, and mathematical subject, and
discusses philosophical and technical ingredients, traits of intelligence, some
social questions, and the past and future of UAI.
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“The formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution,
which may be merely a matter of mathematical or experimental skill. To
raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new
angle, requires creative imagination and marks real advance in science.”
— Albert Einstein (1879–1955)
1 Introduction
The dream. The human mind is one of the great mysteries in the Universe, and
arguably the most interesting phenomenon to study. After all, it is connected to
consciousness and identity which define who we are. Indeed, a healthy mind (and
body) is our most precious possession. Intelligence is the most distinct characteristic
of the human mind, and one we are particularly proud of. It enables us to under-
stand, explore, and considerably shape our world, including ourselves. The field of
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is concerned with the study and construction of artifacts
that exhibit intelligent behavior, commonly by means of computer algorithms. The
grand goal of AI is to develop systems that exhibit general intelligence on a human-
level or beyond. If achieved, this would have a far greater impact on human society
than all previous inventions together, likely resulting in a post-human civilization
that only faintly resembles current humanity [Kur05, Hut12].
The dream of creating such artificial devices that reach or outperform our own
intelligence is an old one with a persistent great divide between “optimists” and
“pessimists”. Apart from the overpowering technical challenges, research on machine
intelligence also involves many fundamental philosophical questions with possibly
inconvenient answers: What is intelligence? Can a machine be intelligent? Can a
machine have free will? Does a human have free will? Is intelligence just an emergent
phenomenon of a simple dynamical system or is it something intrinsically complex?
What will our “Mind Children” be like? How does mortality affect decisions and
actions? to name just a few.
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What was wrong with last century’s AI. Some claim that AI has not progressed
much in the last 50 years. It definitely has progressed much slower than the fathers
of AI expected and/or promised. There are also some philosophical arguments that
the grand goal of creating super-human AI may even be elusive in principle. Both
reasons have lead to a decreased interest in funding and research on the foundations
of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI).
The real problem in my opinion is that early on, AI has focussed on the wrong
paradigm, namely deductive logical; and being unable to get the foundations right
in this framework, AI soon concentrated on practical but limited algorithms. Some
prominent early researchers such as Ray Solomonoff, who actually participated in
the 1956 Dartmouth workshop, generally regarded as the birth of AI, and later Peter
Cheeseman and others, advocated a probabilistic inductive approach but couldn’t
compete with the soon dominating figures such as Marvin Minsky, Nils Nilsson, and
others who advocated a symbolic/logic approach as the foundations of AI. (of course
this paragraph is only a caricature of AI history).
Indeed it has even become an acceptable attitude that general intelligence is in
principle unamenable to a formal definition. In my opinion, claiming something to
be impossible without strong evidence sounds close to an unscientific position; and
there are no convincing arguments against the feasibility of AGI [Cha96, Leg08].
Also, the failure of once-thought-promising AI-paradigms at best shows that
they were not the right approach or maybe they only lacked sufficient computing
power at the time. Indeed, after early optimism mid-last century followed by an AI
depression, there is renewed, justified, optimism [RN10, Sec.1.3.10], as is evident by
the new conference series on Artificial General Intelligence, the Blue Brain project,
the Singularity movement, and the anthologies [GP07, WG12] prove. AI research
has come in waves and paradigms (computation, logic, expert systems, neural nets,
soft approaches, learning, probability). Finally, with the free access to unlimited
amounts of data on the internet, information-centered AI research has blossomed.
New foundations of A(G)I. Universal Artificial Intelligence (UAI) is such a mod-
ern information-theoretic inductive approach to AGI, in which logical reasoning
plays no direct role. UAI is a new paradigm to AGI via a path from universal
induction to prediction to decision to action. It has been investigated in great tech-
nical depth [Hut05] and has already spawned promising formal definitions of rational
intelligence, the optimal rational agent AIXI and practical approximations thereof,
and put AI on solid mathematical foundations. It seems that we could, for the first
time, have a general mathematical theory of (rational) intelligence that is sound
and complete in the sense of well-defining the general AI problem as detailed below.
The theory allows a rigorous mathematical investigation of many interesting philo-
sophical questions surrounding (artificial) intelligence. Since the theory is complete,
definite answers can be obtained for a large variety of intelligence-related questions,
as foreshadowed by the award winning PhD thesis of [Leg08].
Contents. Section 2 provides the context and background for UAI. It will sum-
marize various last century’s paradigms for and approaches to understanding and
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building artificial intelligences, highlighting their problems and how UAI is similar
or different to them. Section 3 then informally describes the ingredients of UAI.
It mentions the UAI-based intelligence measure only in passing to go directly to
the core AIXI definition. In which sense AIXI is the most intelligent agent and
a theoretical solution of the AI problem is explained. Section 4 explains how the
complex phenomenon of intelligence with all its facets can emerge from the simple
AIXI equation. Section 5 considers an embodied version of AIXI embedded into
our society. I go through some important social questions and hint at how AIXI
might behave, but this is essentially unexplored terrain. The technical state-of-the-
art/development of UAI is summarized in Section 6: theoretical results for AIXI and
universal Solomonoff induction; practical approximations, implementations, and ap-
plications of AIXI; UAI-based intelligence measures, tests, and definitions; and the
human knowledge compression contest. Section 7 concludes with a summary and
outlook how UAI helps in formalizing and answering deep philosophical questions
around AGI and last but not least how to build super intelligent agents.
2 The AGI Problem
The term AI means different things to different people. I will first discuss why this is
so, and will argue that this due to a lack of solid and generally agreed-upon founda-
tions of AI. The field of AI soon abandoned its efforts of rectifying this state of affairs,
and pessimists even created a defense mechanism denying the possibility or useful-
ness of a (simple) formal theory of general intelligence. While human intelligence
might indeed be messy and unintelligible, I will argue that a simple formal definition
of machine intelligence is possible and useful. I will discuss how this definition fits
into the various important dimensions of research on (artificial) intelligence including
human↔rational, thinking↔acting, top-down↔bottom-up, the agent framework,
traits of intelligence, deduction↔induction, and learning↔planning.
The problem. I define the AI problem to mean the problem of building systems
that possess general, rather than specific, intelligence in the sense of being able to
solve a wide range of problems generally regarded to require human-level intelligence.
Optimists believe that the AI problem can be solved within a couple of decades
[Kur05]. Pessimists deny its principle feasibility on religious, philosophical, math-
ematical, or technical grounds (see [RN10, Chp.26] for a list of arguments). Opti-
mists have refuted/rebutted all those arguments (see [Cha96, Chp.9] and [Leg08]),
but haven’t produced super-human AI either, so the issue remains unsettled.
One problem in AI, and I will argue key problem, is that there is no general
agreement on what intelligence is. This has lead to endless circular and often fruitless
arguments, and has held up progress. Generally, the lack of a generally-accepted
solid foundation makes high card houses fold easily. Compare this with Russell’s
paradox which shattered the foundations of mathematics, and which was finally
resolved by the completely formal and generally agreed-upon ZF(C) theory of sets.
On the other hand, it is an anomaly that nowadays most AI researchers avoid
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discussing or formalizing intelligence, which is caused by several factors: It is a
difficult old subject, it is politically charged, it is not necessary for narrow AI which
focusses on specific applications, AI research is done primarily by computer scientists
who mainly care about algorithms rather than philosophical foundations, and the
popular belief that general intelligence is principally unamenable to a mathematical
definition. These reasons explain but only partially justify the limited effort in
trying to formalize general intelligence. There is no convincing argument that this
is impossible.
Assume we had a formal, objective, non-anthropocentric, and direct definition,
measure, and/or test of intelligence, or at least a very general intelligence-resembling
formalism that could serve as an adequate substitute. This would bring the higher
goals of the field into tight focus and allow us to objectively and rigorously compare
different approaches and judge the overall progress. Formalizing and rigorously
defining a previously vague concept usually constitutes a quantum leap forward in
the field: Cf. the history of sets, numbers, logic, fluxions/infinitesimals, energy,
infinity, temperature, space, time, observer, etc.
Is a simple formal definition of intelligence possible? Isn’t intelligence a too
complex and anthropocentric phenomenon to allow formalization? Likely not: There
are very simple models of chaotic phenomena such as turbulence. Think about the
simple iterative map z → z2+c that produces the amazingly rich, fractal landscape,
sophisticated versions of it used to produce images of virtual ecosystems as in the
movie Avatar. Or the complexity of (bio)chemistry emerges out of the elegant
mathematical theory Quantum Electro Dynamics.
Modeling human intelligence is probably going to be messy, but ideal rational
behavior seems to capture the essence of intelligence, and, as I claim, can indeed be
completely formalized. Even if there is no unique definition capturing all aspects we
want to include in a definition of intelligence, or if some aspects are forever beyond
formalization (maybe consciousness and qualia), pushing the frontier and studying
the best available formal proxy is of utmost importance for understanding artificial
and natural minds.
Context. There are many fields that try to understand the phenomenon of intel-
ligence and whose insights help in creating intelligent systems: cognitive psychol-
ogy [SMM07] and behaviorism [Ski74], philosophy of mind [Cha02, Sea05], neuro-
science [HB04], linguistics [Hau01, Cho06], anthropology [Par07], machine learning
[SB98, Bis06], logic [Tur84, Llo87], computer science [RN10], biological evolution
[TTJ01, Kar07], economics [McK09], and others.
What is AI? Thinking Acting
humanly Cognitive Turing test,
Science Behaviorism
rationally Laws of Doing the
Thought Right Thing
Cognitive science studies how
humans think, Behaviorism and
the Turing test how humans act,
the laws of thought define rational
thinking, while AI research increas-
ingly focusses on systems that act rationally.
In computer science, most AI research is bottom-up; extending and improving
existing or developing new algorithms and increasing their range of applicability;
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an interplay between experimentation on toy problems and theory, with occasional
real-world applications. A top-down approach would start from a general principle
and derive effective approximations (like heuristic approximations to minimax tree
search). Maybe when the top-down and bottom-up approaches meet in the middle,
we will have arrived at practical truly intelligent machines.
The science of artificial intelligence may be defined as the construction of intel-
ligent systems (artificial agents) and their analysis. A natural definition of a system
is anything that has an input and an output stream, or equivalently an agent that
acts and observes. This agent perspective of AI [RN10] brings some order and uni-
fication into the large variety of problems the fields wants to address, but it is only
a framework rather than providing a complete theory of intelligence. In the absence
of a perfect (stochastic) model of the environment the agent interacts with, machine
learning techniques are needed and employed to learn from experience. There is no
general theory for learning agents (apart from UAI). This has resulted in an ever
increasing number of limited models and algorithms in the past.
What distinguishes an intelligent system from a non-intelligent one? Intelligence
can have many faces like reasoning, creativity, association, generalization, pattern
recognition, problem solving, memorization, planning, achieving goals, learning, op-
timization, self-preservation, vision, language processing, classification, induction,
deduction, and knowledge acquisition and processing. A formal definition incorpo-
rating every aspect of intelligence, however, seems difficult.
There is no lack of attempts to characterize or define intelligence trying to cap-
ture all traits informally [LH07a]. One of the more successful characterizations is:
Intelligence measures an agents ability to perform well in a large range of environ-
ments [LH07b]. Most traits of intelligence are implicit in and emergent from this
definition as these capacities enable an agent to succeed [Leg08]. Convincing formal
definitions other than the ones spawned by UAI are essentially lacking.
Another important dichotomy is whether an approach focusses (more) on de-
duction or induction. Traditional AI concentrates mostly on the logical deductive
reasoning aspect, while machine learning focusses on the inductive inference aspect.
Learning and hence induction are indispensable traits of any AGI. Regrettably, in-
duction is peripheral to traditional AI, and the machine learning community in large
is not interested in A(G)I. It is the field of reinforcement learning at the intersection
of AI and machine learning that has AGI ambitions and takes learning seriously.
UAI in perspective. The theory of Universal Artificial Intelligence developed in
the last decade is a modern information-theoretic, inductive, reinforcement learning
approach to AGI that has been investigated in great technical depth [Hut05].
Like traditional AI, UAI is concerned with agents doing the right thing, but is
otherwise quite different: It is a top-down approach in the sense that it starts with a
single completely formal general definition of intelligence from which an essentially
unique agent that seems to possess all traits of rational intelligence is derived. It is
not just another framework with some gaps to be filled in later, since the agent is
completely defined.
It also takes induction very seriously: Universal learning is one of the agent’s
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two key elements (the other is stochastic planning). Indeed, logic and deduction
play no fundamental role in UAI (but are emergent). This also naturally dissolves
Lucas’ and Penrose’ [Pen94] argument against AGI that Goedel’s incompleteness
result shows that the human mind is not a computer. The fallacy is to assume that
the mind (human and machine alike) are infallible deductive machines.
The status of UAI might be compared to Super String theory in physics. Both are
currently the most promising candidates for a grand unification (of AI and physics,
respectively), although there are also marked differences. Like the unification hier-
archy of physical theories allows relating and regarding the myriad of limited models
as effective approximations, UAI allows us to regard existing approaches to AI as
effective approximations. Understanding AI in this way gives researchers a much
more coherent view of the field.
Indeed, UAI seems to be the first sound and complete mathematical theory of
(rational) intelligence. The next section presents a very brief introduction to UAI
from [Hut09c], together with an informal explanation of what the previous sentence
actually means. See [Hut05] for formal definitions and results.
3 Universal Artificial Intelligence
This section describes the theory of Universal Artificial Intelligence (UAI), a mod-
ern information-theoretic approach to AI, which differs essentially from mainstream
A(G)I research described in the previous sections. The connection of UAI to other
research fields and the philosophical and technical ingredients of UAI (Ockham,
Epicurus, Turing, Bayes, Solomonoff, Kolmogorov, Bellman) are briefly discussed.
The UAI-based universal intelligence measure and order relation in turn define the
(w.r.t. this measure) most intelligent agent AIXI, which seems to be the first sound
and complete theory of a universal optimal rational agent embedded in an arbi-
trary computable but unknown environment with reinforcement feedback. The final
paragraph clarifies what this actually means.
Defining Intelligence. Philosophers, AI researchers, psychologists, and others
have suggested many informal=verbal definitions of intelligence [LH07a], but there
is not too much work on formal definitions that are broad, objective, and non-
anthropocentric. See [LH07b] for a comprehensive collection, discussion and com-
parison of intelligence definitions, tests, and measures with all relevant references.
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss them.
Intelligence is graded, since agents can be more or less intelligent. Therefore it
is more natural to consider measures of intelligence, rather than binary definitions
which would classify agents as intelligent or not based on an (arbitrary) threshold.
This is exactly what UAI provides: A formal, broad, objective, universal measure
of intelligence [LH07b], which formalizes the verbal characterization stated in the
previous section. Agents can be more or less intelligent w.r.t. this measure and
hence can be sorted w.r.t. their intelligence [Hut05, Sec.5.1.4]. One can show that
there is an agent, coined AIXI, that maximizes this measure, which could therefore
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be called the most intelligent agent.
I will not present the UAI-based intelligence measure [LH07b] and order relation
[Hut05] here, but, after listing the conceptual ingredients to UAI and AIXI, directly
proceed to defining and discussing AIXI.
UAI and AIXI ingredients [Hut09c]. The theory of UAI has interconnections
with (draws from and contributes to) many research fields, encompassing computer
science (artificial intelligence, machine learning, computation), engineering (infor-
mation theory, adaptive control), economics (rational agents, game theory), math-
ematics (statistics, probability), psychology (behaviorism, motivation, incentives),
and philosophy (inductive inference, theory of knowledge). The concrete ingredi-
ents in AIXI are as follows: Intelligent actions are based on informed decisions.
Attaining good decisions requires predictions which are typically based on models
of the environments. Models are constructed or learned from past observations via
induction. Fortunately, based on the deep philosophical insights and powerful math-
ematical developments, all these problems have been overcome, at least in theory:
So what do we need (from a mathematical point of view) to construct a universal
optimal learning agent interacting with an arbitrary unknown environment? The
theory, coined UAI, developed in the last decade and explained in [Hut05] says:
All you need is Ockham, Epicurus, Turing, Bayes, Solomonoff [Sol64], Kolmogorov
[Kol65], and Bellman [Bel57]: Sequential decision theory [Ber06b] (Bellman’s equa-
tion) formally solves the problem of rational agents in uncertain worlds if the true
environmental probability distribution is known. If the environment is unknown,
Bayesians [Ber93] replace the true distribution by a weighted mixture of distribu-
tions from some (hypothesis) class. Using the large class of all (semi)measures that
are (semi)computable on a Turing machine bears in mind Epicurus, who teaches not
to discard any (consistent) hypothesis. In order not to ignore Ockham, who would
select the simplest hypothesis, Solomonoff defined a universal prior that assigns
high/low prior weight to simple/complex environments [RH11], where Kolmogorov
quantifies complexity [LV08]. Their unification constitutes the theory of UAI and
resulted in the universal intelligence measure and order relation and the following
model/agent AIXI.
The AIXI Model in one line [Hut09c]. It is possible to write down the AIXI
model explicitly in one line, although one should not expect to be able to grasp the
full meaning and power from this compact and somewhat simplified representation.
r1|o1 r2|o2 r3|o3 r4|o4 r5|o5 r6|o6 ...
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
...
work Agent tape ... work Environ-ment tape ...
✟
✟
✟
✟✙ ❍
❍
❍
❍❨
✏
✏
✏
✏
✏✏✶PP
P
P
PPq
.AIXI is an agent that interacts with
an environment in cycles k = 1, 2, ..., m.
In cycle k, AIXI takes action ak (e.g.
a limb movement) based on past per-
ceptions o1r1..ok−1rk−1 as defined below.
Thereafter, the environment provides a
(regular) observation ok (e.g. a camera
image) to AIXI and a real-valued reward rk. The reward can be very scarce, e.g.
just +1 (-1) for winning (losing) a chess game, and 0 at all other times. Then the
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next cycle k+1 starts. This agent-environment interaction protocol can be depicted
as on the right. Given the interaction protocol above, the simplest version of AIXI
is defined by
AIXI ak := argmax
ak
∑
okrk
...max
am
∑
omrm
[rk + ...+ rm]
∑
q :U(q,a1..am)=o1r1..omrm
2−ℓ(q)
The expression shows that AIXI tries to maximize its total future reward rk + ...+
rm. If the environment is modeled by a deterministic program q, then the future
perceptions ...okrk..omrm = U(q, a1..am) can be computed, where U is a universal
(monotone Turing) machine executing q given a1..am. Since q is unknown, AIXI
has to maximize its expected reward, i.e. average rk + ... + rm over all possible
future perceptions created by all possible environments q that are consistent with
past perceptions. The simpler an environment, the higher is its a-priori contribution
2−ℓ(q), where simplicity is measured by the length ℓ of program q. AIXI effectively
learns by eliminating Turing machines q once they become inconsistent with the
progressing history. Since noisy environments are just mixtures of deterministic
environments, they are automatically included [RH11, Sec.7.2],[WSH11]. The sums
in the formula constitute the averaging process. Averaging and maximization have to
be performed in chronological order, hence the interleaving of max and Σ (similarly
to minimax for games).
One can fix any finite action and perception space, any reasonable U , and any
large finite lifetime m. This completely and uniquely defines AIXI’s actions ak,
which are limit-computable via the expression above (all quantities are known).
Discussion. The AIXI model seems to be the first sound and complete theory of a
universal optimal rational agent embedded in an arbitrary computable but unknown
environment with reinforcement feedback. AIXI is universal in the sense that it is
designed to be able to interact with any (deterministic or stochastic) computable
environment; the universal Turing machines on which it is based is crucially respon-
sible for this. AIXI is complete in the sense that it is not an incomplete framework or
partial specification (like Bayesian statistics which leaves open the choice of the prior
or the rational agent framework or the subjective expected utility principle) but is
completely and essentially uniquely defined. AIXI is sound in the sense of being (by
construction) free of any internal contradictions (unlike e.g. in knowledge-based de-
ductive reasoning systems where avoiding inconsistencies can be very challenging).
AIXI is optimal in the senses that: no other agent can perform uniformly better
or equal in all environments, it is a unification of two optimal theories themselves,
a variant is self-optimizing; and it is likely also optimal in other/stronger senses.
AIXI is rational in the sense of trying to maximize its future long-term reward. For
the reasons above I have argued that AIXI is a mathematical “solution” of the AI
problem: AIXI would be able to learn any learnable task and likely better so than
any other unbiased agent, but AIXI is more a theory or formal definition rather
than an algorithm, since it is only limit-computable. How can an equation that fits
into a single line capture the diversity, complexity, and essence of (rational) intel-
ligence? We know that complex appearing phenomena such as chaos and fractals
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can have simple descriptions such as iterative maps and the complexity of chemistry
emerges from simple physical laws. There is no a-priori reason why ideal ratio-
nal intelligent behavior should not also have a simple description, with most traits
of intelligence being emergent. Indeed, even an axiomatic characterization seems
possible [SH11a, SH11b].
4 Facets of Intelligence
Intelligence can have many faces. I will argue in this section that the AIXI model
possesses all or at least most properties an intelligent rational agent should possess.
Some facets have already been formalized, some are essentially built-in, but the
majority have to be emergent. Some of the claims have been proven in [Hut05] but
the majority has yet to be addressed.
Generalization is essentially inductive inference [RH11]. Induction is the process
of inferring general laws or models from observations or data by finding regularities
in past/other data. This trait is a fundamental cornerstone of intelligence.
Prediction is concerned with forecasting future observations (often based on models
of the world learned) from past observations. Solomonoff’s theory of prediction
[Sol64, Sol78] is a universally optimal solution of the prediction problem [Hut07,
RH11]. Since it is a key ingredient in the AIXI model, it is natural to expect that
AIXI is an optimal predictor if rewarded for correct predictions. Curiously only
weak and limited rigorous results could be proven so far [Hut05, Sec.6.2].
Pattern recognition, abstractly speaking, is concerned with classifying data (pat-
terns). This requires a similarity measure between patterns. Supervised classifi-
cation can essentially be reduced to a sequence prediction problem, hence formally
pattern recognition reduces to the previous item, although interesting questions
specific to classification emerge [Hut05, Chp.3].
Association. Two stimuli or observations are associated if there exists some
(cor)relation between them. A set of observations can often be clustered into differ-
ent categories of similar=associated items. For AGI, a universal similarity measure
is required. Kolmogorov complexity via the universal similarity metric [CV05] can
provide such a measure, but many fundamental questions have yet to be explored:
How does association function in AIXI? How can Kolmogorov complexity well-define
the (inherently? so far?) ill-defined clustering problem?
Reasoning is arguably the most prominent trait of human intelligence. Interest-
ingly deductive reasoning and logic are not part of the AIXI architecture. The
fundamental assumption is that there is no sure knowledge of the world, all infer-
ence is tentative and inductive, and that logic and deduction constitute an idealized
limit applicable in situations where uncertainties are extremely small, i.e. probabil-
ities are extremely close to 1 or 0. What would be very interesting to show is that
logic is an emergent phenomenon, i.e. that AIXI learns to reason logically if/since
this helps collect reward.
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Problem solving might be defined as goal-oriented reasoning, and hence reduces
to the previous item, since AIXI is designed to achieve goals (which is reward
maximization in the special case of a terminal reward when the goal is achieved).
Problems can be of very different nature, and some of the other traits of intelligence
can be regarded as instances of problem solving, e.g. planning.
Planning ability is directly incorporated in AIXI via the alternating maximization
and summation in the definition. Algorithmically AIXI plans through its entire life
via a deep expectimax tree search up to its death, based on its belief about the world.
In known constrained domains this search corresponds to classical exact planning
strategies as e.g. exemplified in [Hut05, Chp.6].
Creativity is the ability to generate innovative ideas and to manifest these into
reality. Creative people are often more successful than unimaginative ones. Since
AIXI is the ultimate success-driven agent, AIXI should be highly creative, but this
has yet to be formalized and proven, or at least exemplified.
Knowledge. AIXI stores the entire interaction history and has perfect memory.
Additionally, models of the experienced world are constructed (learned) from this
information in form of short(est) programs. These models guide AIXI’s behavior,
so constitute knowledge for AIXI. Any ontology is implicit in these programs.
How short-term, long-term, relational, hierarchical, etc. memory emerges out of this
compression-based approach has not yet been explored.
Actions influence the environment which reacts back to the agent. Decisions
can have long-term consequences, which the expectimax planner of AIXI should
properly take into account. Particular issues of concern are the interplay of learning
and planning (the infamous exploration↔exploitation tradeoff [LH11]). Additional
complications that arise from embodied agents will be considered in the next section.
Learning. There are many different forms of learning: supervised, unsupervised,
semi-supervised, reinforcement, transfer, associative, transductive, prequential, and
many others. By design, AIXI is a reinforcement learner, but one can show that it
will also “listen” to an informative teacher, i.e. it learns to learn supervised [Hut05,
Sec.6.5]. It is plausible that AIXI can also acquire the other learning techniques.
Self-awareness allows one to (meta)reason about one’s own thoughts, which is an
important trait of higher intelligence, in particularly when interacting with other
forms of intelligence. Technically all what might be needed is that an agent has and
exploits not only a model of the world but also a model of itself including aspects of
its own algorithm, and this recursively. Is AIXI self-aware in this technical sense?
Consciousness is possibly the most mysterious trait of the human mind. Whether
anything rigorous can ever be said about the consciousness of AIXI or AIs in general
is not clear and in any case beyond my expertise. I leave this to philosophers of the
mind [Cha02] like the world-renowned expert on (the hard problem of) conscious-
ness, David Chalmers [Cha96].
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5 Social Questions
Consider now a sophisticated physical humanoid robot like Honda’s ASIMO but
equipped with an AIXI brain. The observations ok consist of camera image, micro-
phone signal, and other sensory input. The actions ak consist of controlling mainly a
loud speaker and motors for limbs, but possibly other internal functions it has direct
control over. The reward rk should be some combination of its own “well-being”
(e.g. proportional to its battery level and condition of its body parts) and external
reward/punishment from some “teacher(s)”.
Imagine now what happens if this AIXI-robot is let loose in our society. Many
questions deserving attention arise, and some are imperative to be rigorously inves-
tigated before risking this experiment.
Children of higher animals require extensive nurturing in a safe environment
because they lack sufficient innate skills for survival in the real world, but are com-
pensated for their ability to learn to perform well in a large range of environments.
AIXI is at the extreme of being “born” with essentially no knowledge about our
world, but a universal “brain” for learning and planning in any environment where
this is possible. As such, it also requires a guiding teacher initially. Otherwise it
would simply run out of battery.
AIXI has to learn vision, language, and motor skills from scratch, similarly to
higher animals and machine learning algorithms, but more extreme/general. Indeed,
Solomonoff [Sol64] already showed how his system can learn grammar from positive
instances only, but much remains to be done. Appropriate training sequences and re-
ward shaping in this early “childhood” phase of AIXI are important. AIXI can learn
from rather crude teachers as long as the reward is biased in the ‘right’ direction.
The answers to many of the following questions likely depend on the upbringing of
AIXI:
• Schooling: Will a pure reward maximizer such as AIXI listen to and trust a
teacher and learn to learn supervised (=faster)? Yes [Hut05, Sec.6.5].
• Take Drugs (hacking the reward system): Likely no, since long-term reward
would be small (death), but see [RO11].
• Replication or procreation: Likely yes, if AIXI believes that clones or
descendants are useful for its own goals.
• Suicide: Likely yes (no), if AIXI is raised to believe to go to heaven (hell)
i.e. maximal (minimal) reward forever.
• Self-Improvement: Likely yes, since this helps to increase reward.
• Manipulation: Manipulate or threaten teacher to give more reward.
• Attitude: Are pure reward maximizers egoists, psychopaths, and/or killers or
will they be friendly (altruism as extended ego(t)ism)?
• Curiosity killed the cat and maybe AIXI, or is extra reward for curiosity
necessary [Sch07, Ors10]?
• Immortality can cause laziness [Hut05, Sec.5.7]!
• Can self-preservation be learned or need (parts of) it be innate.
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• Socializing: How will AIXI interact with another AIXI [Hut09c,
Sec.5j],[PH06]?
A partial discussion of some of these questions can be found in [Hut05] but many
are essentially unexplored. Point is that since AIXI is completely formal, it permits
to formalize these questions and to mathematically analyze them. That is, UAI has
the potential to arrive at definite answers to various questions regarding the social
behavior of super-intelligences. Some formalizations and semi-formal answers have
recently appeared in the award-winning papers [OR11, RO11].
6 State of the Art
This section describes the technical achievements of UAI to date. Some remarkable
and surprising results have already been obtained. Various theoretical consistency
and optimality results for AIXI have been proven, although stronger results would be
desirable. On the other hand, the special case of universal induction and prediction
in non-reactive environments is essentially closed. From the practical side, various
computable approximations of AIXI have been developed, with the latest MC-AIXI-
CTW incarnation exhibiting impressive performance. Practical approximations of
the universal intelligence measure have also been used to test and consistently order
systems of limited intelligence. Some other related work such as the compression
contest is also briefly mentioned, and references to some more practical but less
general work such as feature reinforcement learning are given.
Theory of UAI. Forceful theoretical arguments that AIXI is the most intelligent
general-purpose agent incorporating all aspects of rational intelligence have been
put forward, supported by partial proofs. For this, results of many fields had to be
pulled together or developed in the first place: Kolmogorov complexity [LV08], in-
formation theory [CT06], sequential decision theory [Ber06b], reinforcement learning
[SB98], artificial intelligence [RN10], Bayesian statistics [Ber06a], universal induc-
tion [RH11], and rational agents [SLB09]. Various notions of optimality have been
considered. The difficulty is coming up with sufficiently strong but still satisfiable
notions. Some are weaker than desirable, others are too strong for any agent to
achieve. What has been shown thus far is that AIXI learns the correct predictive
model [Hut05], is Pareto optimal in the sense that no other agent can perform uni-
formly better or equal in all environments, and a variant is self-optimizing in the
sense that asymptotically the accumulated reward is as high as possible, i.e. the
same as the maximal reward achievable by a completely informed agent [Hut02b].
AIXI is likely also optimal in other/stronger senses. An axiomatic characterization
has also been developed [SH11a, SH11b].
The induction problem. The induction problem is a fundamental problem in
philosophy [Ear93, RH11] and science [Jay03, Wal05, GHW11], and a key sub-
component of UAI. Classical open problems around induction are the zero prior
problem and the confirmation of (universal) hypotheses in general and the Black
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ravens paradox in particular, reparametrization invariance, the old-evidence problem
and ad-hoc hypotheses, and the updating problem [Ear93]. In a series of papers
(see [Hut07] for references) it has been shown that Solomonoff’s theory of universal
induction essentially solves or circumvents all these problems [RH11]. It is also
predictively optimal and has minimal regret for arbitrary loss functions.
It is fair to say that Solomonoff’s theory serves as an adequate mathemati-
cal/theoretical foundation of induction [RH11], machine learning [Hut11], and com-
ponent of UAI [Hut05].
Computable approximations of AIXI.An early critique of UAI was that AIXI is
incomputable. The down-scaled still provably optimal AIXItl model [Hut05, Chp.7]
based on universal search algorithms [Lev73, Hut02a, Gag07] was still computation-
ally intractable. The Optimal Ordered Problem Solver [Sch04] was the first practical
implementation of universal search and has been able to solve open learning tasks
such as Towers-of-Hanoi for arbitrary number of disks, robotic behavior, and others.
For repeated 2× 2 matrix games such as the Prisoner’s dilemma, a direct brute-
force approximation of AIXI is computationally tractable. Despite these domains
being tiny, they raise notoriously difficult questions [SLB09]. The experimental
results confirmed the theoretical optimality claims of AIXI [PH06], as far as limited
experiments are able to do so.
A Monte-Carlo approximation of AIXI has been proposed in [Pan08] that sam-
ples programs according to their algorithmic probability as a way of approximating
Solomonoff’s universal a-priori probability, similar to sampling from the speed prior
[Sch02].
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The most powerful sys-
tematic approximation,
implementation, and appli-
cation of AIXI so far is the
MC-AIXI-CTW algorithm
[VNHS10]. It combines
award-winning ideas from
universal Bayesian data com-
pression [WST95] and the
recent highly successful (in
computer Go) upper confi-
dence bound algorithm for
expectimax tree search [KS06]. For the first time, without any domain knowledge,
the same agent is able to self-adapt to a diverse range of environments. For
instance, AIXI, is able to learn from scratch how to play TicTacToe, Pacman, Kuhn
Poker, and other games by trial and error without even providing the rules of the
games [VNH+11].
Measures/tests/definitions of intelligence. The history of informal defini-
tions and measures of intelligence [LH07a] and anthropocentric tests of intelli-
gence [Tur50] is long and old. In the last decade various formal definitions, mea-
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sures and tests have been suggested: Solomonoff induction and Kolmogorov com-
plexity inspired the universal C-test [HO00, HOMC98], while AIXI inspired an
extremely general, objective, fundamental, and formal intelligence order relation
[Hut05] and a universal intelligence measure [LH07b, Leg08], which have already
attracted the popular scientific press [Fie´05] and received the SIAI award. Practi-
cal instantiations thereof [HOD10, LV11] also received quite some media attention
(http://users.dsic.upv.es/proy/anynt/).
Less related/general work. There is of course other less related, less general
work, similar in spirit to or with similar aims as UAI/AIXI, e.g. UTree [McC96],
URL [FMRW10], PORL [SHL97, SH99], FOMDP [SB09], FacMDP [SDL07], PSR
[SLJ+03], POMDP [DV09], and others. The feature reinforcement learning approach
also belongs to this category [Hut09b, Hut09a, SH10, NSH11].
Compression contest. The ongoing Human Knowledge Compression Contest
[Hut06] is another outgrowth of UAI. The contest is motivated by the fact that
being able to compress well is closely related to being able to predict well and
ultimately to act intelligently, thus reducing the slippery concept of intelligence
to hard file size numbers. Technically it is a community project to approximate
Kolmogorov complexity on real-world textual data. In order to compress data, one
has to find regularities in them, which is intrinsically difficult (many researchers
live from analyzing data and finding compact models). So compressors better than
the current “dumb” compressors need to be smart(er). Since the prize wants to
stimulate the development of “universally” smart compressors, a “universal” corpus
of data has been chosen. Arguably the online encyclopedia Wikipedia is a good
snapshot of the Human World Knowledge. So the ultimate compressor of it should
“understand” all human knowledge, i.e. be really smart. The contest is meant to
be a cost-effective way of motivating researchers to spend time towards achieving
AGI via the promising and quantitative path of compression. The competition raised
considerable attention when launched, but to retain attention the prize money should
be increased (sponsors are welcome), and the setup needs some adaptation.
7 Discussion
Formalizing and answering deep philosophical questions. UAI deepens our
understanding of artificial (and to a limited extent human) intelligence; in particu-
lar which and how facets of intelligence can be understood as emergent phenomena
of goal- or reward-driven actions in unknown environments. UAI allows a more
quantitative and rigorous discussion of various philosophical questions around intel-
ligence, and ultimately settling these questions. This can and partly has been done
by formalizing the philosophical concepts related to intelligence under consideration,
and by studying them mathematically. Formal definitions may not perfectly or not
one-to-one or not uniquely correspond to their intuitive counterparts, but in this
case alternative formalizations allow comparison and selection. In this way it might
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even be possible to rigorously answer various social and ethical questions: whether
a super rational intelligence such as AIXI will be benign to humans and/or its ilk, or
behave psychopathically and kill or enslave humans, or be insane and e.g. commit
suicide.
Building more intelligent agents. From a practical point of building intelligent
agents, since AIXI is incomputable or more precisely only limit-computable, it has
to be approximated in practice. The results achieved with the MC-AIXI-CTW
approximation are only the beginning. As outlined in [VNH+11], many variations
and extensions are possible, in particular to incorporate long-term memory and
smarter planning heuristics. The same single MC-AIXI-CTW agent is already able
to learn to play TicTacToe, Kuhn Poker, and most impressively Pacman [VNH+11]
from scratch. Besides Pacman, there are hundreds of other arcade games from the
1980s, and it would be sensational if a single algorithm could learn them all solely by
trial and error, which seems feasible for (a variant of) MC-AIXI-CTW. While these
are “just” recreational games, they do contain many prototypical elements of the real
world, such as food, enemies, friends, space, obstacles, objects, and weapons. Next
could be a test in modern virtual worlds (e.g. bots for VR/role games or intelligent
software agents for the internet) that require intelligent agents, and finally some
selected real-world problems.
Epilogue. It is virtually impossible to predict the future rate of progress but
past progress on UAI makes me confident that UAI as a whole will continually
progress. By providing rigorous foundations to AI, I believe that UAI will also
speed up progress in the field of A(G)I in general. In any case, UAI is a very useful
educational tool with AIXI being a gold standard for intelligent agents which other
practical general purpose AI programs should aim for.
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